1. “The crisis ended after thirteen days.”
The correction: The immediate confrontation eased on 28 October; the withdrawal and negotiations continued.
The familiar thirteen days run from Kennedy’s briefing on 16 October to Khrushchev’s withdrawal announcement on 28 October. Soviet preparations had begun months earlier. The Il-28 bombers remained a subject of negotiation in November, and the last Soviet tactical nuclear warheads left Cuba on 1 December. A date for the settlement is not the same as a date for every weapon’s departure.
Sources for this passage: [1] [2] [3]2. “Kennedy discovered the missiles on 14 October.”
The correction: The photographs were taken on 14 October; Kennedy was informed on 16 October.
Richard Heyser’s U-2 flight supplied crucial photographic evidence. The film then had to be processed and interpreted before the conclusions reached the President. Confusing the flight date with the briefing date removes the work of the photographic interpreters and shifts the start of the White House decision-making by two days.
Sources for this passage: [4] [1]3. “Kennedy won without making concessions.”
The correction: The settlement included an American non-invasion assurance and a confidential assurance about Turkey.
Soviet withdrawal from Cuba was the most visible result. The private channel also conveyed that the American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed within months. Robert Kennedy’s later memorandum and Khrushchev’s private letter must be compared: the public announcements did not disclose the entire understanding. Calling the outcome an unconditional surrender hides a central part of the diplomacy.
Sources for this passage: [5] [6]4. “Britain’s Thors were the missiles traded away.”
The correction: The explicit confidential assurance concerned Jupiter missiles in Turkey, not Thor in Britain.
Both were American-built intermediate-range ballistic missiles, but they belonged to different deployments. Britain’s Thor force was operated by RAF crews under British–American arrangements. Its withdrawal in 1963 had been planned before the crisis. Similar withdrawal dates do not make it part of the same bargain.
Sources for this passage: [6] [7]5. “Britain was only a spectator.”
The correction: British diplomacy, bombers and Thor crews were involved in the wider confrontation.
Macmillan spoke directly with Kennedy, while British nuclear forces prepared for the possibility that fighting would spread. The danger to Berlin was part of Kennedy’s explanation to the Prime Minister. Britain did not control the American quarantine, but its bases, forces and population could have become involved in a war extending beyond the Caribbean.
Sources for this passage: [8] [9] [10]6. “Every American force went to DEFCON 2.”
The correction: DEFCON 2 must be attributed to Strategic Air Command, rather than automatically to every command.
SAC raised its readiness to DEFCON 2 on 24 October. Alert conditions varied between commands and forces; Britain also had its own procedures. A statement about one command should not become a claim about every American or NATO unit. Identify the force and date whenever an alert level is mentioned.
Sources for this passage: [11] [9]7. “Ready to launch meant ordered to launch.”
The correction: Technical readiness and political authorisation were separate.
The RAF account records fifty-nine of sixty Thors at fifteen-minute readiness during the crisis. That meant the force could respond rapidly to an authorised order, not that a countdown to war had become inevitable. Britain and the United States retained separate roles in control of the missile and warhead. A crew’s readiness should not be rewritten as a government decision to fire.
Sources for this passage: [10] [7]8. “Loading oxygen proves a Thor was about to fire.”
The correction: Liquid-oxygen loading alone does not establish a live launch or its authorisation.
Thor used liquid oxygen as the oxidiser and RP-1, a refined kerosene, as fuel. Harrington Museum’s account notes that missiles were regularly filled with liquid oxygen, including within the training regime, while distinguishing the handling of RP-1. To establish what happened at a particular station, an account needs a date, the stage of the countdown and evidence of the orders received. General technical capability cannot supply those missing facts.
Sources for this passage: [12]9. “Operational R-14 missiles were in Cuba.”
The correction: R-14 sites were being prepared, but the missiles themselves did not arrive.
The Soviet plan included the longer-range R-14, known to NATO as the SS-5. Warheads intended for the system reached Cuba aboard Aleksandrovsk, but the ships carrying the missiles did not. Contemporary American intelligence remained uncertain about the deployment. A map showing the system’s potential range must therefore label it as planned, rather than imply a ready-to-fire force existed.
Sources for this passage: [13]10. “All the missiles in Cuba did the same job.”
The correction: Strategic ballistic missiles, air-defence missiles and tactical nuclear systems had different roles.
The R-12 could attack distant land targets. The S-75/SA-2 was designed to intercept aircraft and was the system that brought down Anderson’s U-2. Luna rockets and FKR-1 cruise missiles threatened targets in the local theatre. Removing the strategic missiles did not automatically settle the future of every other Soviet weapon in Cuba.
Sources for this passage: [4] [3]11. “B-59 was a nuclear-powered submarine.”
The correction: B-59 was diesel-electric, but carried a nuclear torpedo.
Nuclear-armed describes a weapon; nuclear-powered describes propulsion. B-59 depended on batteries while submerged and on diesel machinery to recharge them. Heat, endurance and communications problems formed part of the danger during the American pursuit. Calling it nuclear-powered removes an important reason the crew was under such pressure.
Sources for this passage: [14]12. “One person alone saved the world.”
The correction: Individual restraint mattered, but the outcome depended on several people, channels and decisions.
Arkhipov’s part in the B-59 encounter deserves attention. However, later testimony does not provide an unquestionable, word-for-word account of the discussion inside the submarine. Diplomacy in Washington and Moscow, Kennedy’s response to the U-2 loss, and decisions by other officers also mattered. The point is not to diminish an individual’s contribution, but to avoid turning a complicated crisis into a fully documented scene that the evidence cannot support.
Sources for this passage: [14] [15]13. “The quarantine stopped every ship and all trade.”
The correction: It targeted specified offensive military equipment, and some ships were allowed through.
The tanker Bucharest continued after surveillance without being boarded. On 26 October, the freighter Marucla was boarded, inspected and released when no prohibited offensive weapons were found. These decisions depended on identification, cargo assessment and orders. The quarantine was not an instruction to sink or turn back every vessel approaching Cuba.
Sources for this passage: [16] [17] [18]14. “The two U-2 incidents on 27 October were one flight.”
The correction: Anderson’s flight over Cuba and Maultsby’s Arctic mission were separate.
Rudolf Anderson was killed when his U-2 was shot down over Cuba. Charles Maultsby strayed into Soviet airspace on a separate air-sampling mission and returned safely. Their overlap increased the risk of misunderstanding, but combining them gives the wrong pilot, location and outcome to each event.
Sources for this passage: [19] [20]15. “Castro agreed the superpower settlement.”
The correction: Castro did not negotiate the Kennedy–Khrushchev exchange and objected to how it was reached.
Cuba was the country facing immediate attack, yet the essential withdrawal bargain was made between Washington and Moscow. Castro’s concerns about sovereignty and inspection complicated the aftermath. Mikoyan’s November discussions with him show that acceptance between the two superpowers did not mean every disagreement with their Cuban ally had been resolved.
Sources for this passage: [21] [22]16. “A film’s dialogue is a record of what was said.”
The correction: Historical drama reconstructs events; a documentary also selects and interprets its evidence.
Thirteen Days and The Missiles of October are dramatisations, not recordings of ExComm. The Fog of War includes McNamara’s later reflections, which have a different evidential status from a meeting record written in 1962. Films can be valuable introductions, but a striking scene or remembered quotation should be checked against the original recordings, documents or clearly identified testimony.
Sources for this passage: [23] [24] [25]