Area 1 · R-12 / SS-4
San Cristóbal area
Western Cuba’s medium-range missile deployment. The map uses the vicinity of Site 1, photographed on 14 and 23 October; it does not plot every launch pad.
Sources for this passage: [1] [2]Read about the R-12 →The geography of October 1962
The crisis on a map.
Missile areas in Cuba. An interception line in the Atlantic. Ships approaching the island. Explore the geography behind the thirteen days.
Fit the whole map, or enlarge it and swipe across.
Numbers identify missile areas; letters identify ships. All locations are explained below. On a small screen, choose “Enlarge map” for a wider, scrollable view.
Caribbean overview · missile-area markers are approximate.
1 R-12 deployment area3 Planned R-14 area Approximate quarantine line Schematic direction of travelA Dated ship position R-12 range · deployed R-14 range · planned only
Original explanatory map. Coastlines: Natural Earth, public domain. Mercator projection; range boundaries calculated as great-circle distances. Read the map’s sources and limitations ↓
On the island
Four deployment areas.
The numbered markers identify areas, not every individual launch site. Solid circles represent the R-12 medium-range deployment. Dashed squares distinguish construction for the planned R-14 force.
Area 2 · R-12 / SS-4
Sagua la Grande area
The second main medium-range deployment area, in central Cuba. This marker is a rounded town-area reference, not a surveyed missile-site coordinate.
Sources for this passage: [1] [3]Read about the R-12 →Area 3 · R-14 / SS-5 · planned
Guanajay area
Longer-range missile installations were being constructed near Havana. The R-14 missiles intended for Cuba never arrived.
Sources for this passage: [1] [4]Read about the R-14 →Area 4 · R-14 / SS-5 · planned
Remedios area
Central Cuban construction area associated with the planned intermediate-range deployment. A town-area marker indicates the vicinity, not an operational R-14 launcher.
Sources for this passage: [3] [4]Read about the R-14 →At sea · 23–27 October
Positions, routes and encounters.
Each letter belongs to a dated report. The arrows show an illustrative direction of travel from two reported positions; they do not trace complete voyages or identify where boarding took place. The submarine marker has no inferred route.
Position A
Marucla
25 October, 21:07 (Washington time)
26°52′N, 72°21′W
Sighted by an aircraft from Randolph; John R. Pierce and Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. were sent to intercept. The westward arrow illustrates the reported Cuba-bound voyage, not the boarding position or an exact track.
Sources for this passage: [5]Position B
Vinnitsa
23 October, 22:00 (reported in the 25 October summary)
23°20′N, 70°30′W
A Soviet tanker reported on its way to Havana. The dashed arrow suggests its westward approach; it is not a reconstructed navigation log.
Sources for this passage: [5]Position C
B-59 / USS Beale contact
27 October, 20:50 (ship’s log time)
27°36′N, 66°00′W
Beale’s log records a Soviet Foxtrot submarine surfacing here. The encounter is identified with B-59 in the accompanying archival research. No underwater track is inferred.
Sources for this passage: [6] [7]Evidence and interpretation
How to read this map.
The quarantine was an interception operation
The amber dashed curve represents the initial offshore quarantine line described in the US Navy’s history, from approximately 27°30′N, 75°W to 20°N, 65°W. It is a schematic curve between those endpoints, not a legal boundary or a ring of ships immediately around Cuba.
Naval dispositions changed. Another Navy account gives the northern endpoint as 70°W instead of 75°W. This map follows the first account and deliberately labels the line approximate. It should not be used to infer a precise interception sector.
Sources for this passage: [8] [9]The proclamation targeted specified offensive military cargo. It did not mean that every ship approaching Cuba would be stopped and searched.
Sources for this passage: [10]The quarantine and its purpose →Range is not a blast radius
The range view uses US intelligence estimates of 1,020 nautical miles for the R-12 (about 1,889 km), and 2,200 nautical miles for the R-14 (about 4,074 km). These are period estimates, not a statement of every missile’s exact performance.
The blue boundary is measured from the San Cristóbal Site 1 vicinity; the purple dashed boundary uses the Guanajay area. Different launch locations move the boundary. The outlines show geographical reach, not selected targets, flight paths, accuracy or nuclear effects.
Sources for this passage: [1]The R-14 comparison is switched off initially because those missiles never reached Cuba. Turning it on illustrates the intended deployment, not a capability operational during the thirteen days.
Sources for this passage: [4]Locations are not all equally precise
The San Cristóbal reference uses the rounded coordinate printed on the 23 October briefing photograph. The other missile markers use approximate town-area centres to orient the reader; they are not surveyed launch pads. No claim is made that a missile stood at a town centre.
Ship markers use the coordinates in the cited operational reports. Those reports are historical observations with their own uncertainties. Combining several dates on one map does not place all three vessels there at the same moment.
Sources for this passage: [2] [3] [5] [6]A map of the strategic confrontation
This is a selection of the main ballistic-missile deployment areas and documented naval encounters. It does not show every Soviet weapon in Cuba, every American patrol, or the full network of surface-to-air missile sites.
The contemporary intelligence picture was incomplete and changed as new photographs arrived. Read the reconnaissance images alongside the map to see the difference between visible equipment and the conclusions drawn from it.
Sources for this passage: [1]Read the reconnaissance photographs →Sources for this page10 references
Numbers refer to the passages above. Open a title to read the source, or use a return link to go back to its citation.
- FRUS supplement, document 342: joint evaluation of the Soviet missile threat, 19 October 1962↩ 1↩ 2↩ 3↩ 4↩ 5
- National Security Archive, reconnaissance photographs 15–24: original briefing boards, 14–23 October 1962↩ 1↩ 2
- FRUS XI, document 214: CIA assessment of deployment areas and construction, 28 November 1962↩ 1↩ 2↩ 3
- National Security Archive: invasion planning and the R-14 deployment that did not arrive↩ 1↩ 2↩ 3
- US Navy operations summary, 25 October 1962: quarantine and carrier movements (transcription)↩ 1↩ 2↩ 3
- USS Beale deck log, 27–28 October 1962: submarine contact and surfacing (transcription)↩ 1↩ 2
- National Security Archive: The Underwater Cuban Missile Crisis at 60↩ Back to text
- US Navy operational history: quarantine, 22–26 October↩ Back to text
- US Navy historical review: quarantine forces, Walnut stations and naval operations↩ Back to text
- Proclamation 3504: Interdiction of offensive weapons, 23 October↩ Back to text