More than a location on a map

For Cuban leaders, October 1962 concerned the survival of their government and revolution. The Bay of Pigs and continuing covert operations made another attack a credible threat. Soviet assistance promised protection, but also drew Cuba into a confrontation between nuclear powers.

Cuba's government consented to the missile deployment. That decision did not give Havana control over Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. Political agreement, military presence and authority to launch were different things.

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Castro's warning

In his letter to Khrushchev during the crisis, Castro described an American attack as imminent and distinguished an air strike from a full invasion. His argument about Soviet nuclear action was conditional on an invasion; it was nevertheless an exceptionally dangerous recommendation.

The document must be read with its context and sequence intact. It is evidence of Castro's judgement and fears, not proof that the Cuban population shared a single view or that he could order a Soviet nuclear strike.

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The costs of exclusion

Castro objected to the settlement being reached without consultation with Cuba. For Havana, an American non-invasion assurance did not settle every question of sovereignty or security. Refusal of inspection complicated implementation.

Mikoyan's November discussions show a difficult alliance, with Cuban leaders challenging Soviet concessions. Cuba continued to matter after the famous exchange of letters; it was neither a passive backdrop nor a government free to dictate Soviet nuclear policy.

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