A Luna rocket carried on its tracked 2P16 launcher in an outdoor museum display.
A 2K6 Luna rocket system on its tracked 2P16 launcher, at the Artillery Museum in Saint Petersburg, 10 August 2016. This is the earlier Luna family, distinct from the later wheeled Luna-M.Alf van Beem. Via Wikimedia Commons. Resized and converted to WebP; no further crop. Source record · Public domain — released by the photographerView full image ↗
Country:
Soviet Union
Luna:
Short-range battlefield rocket
FKR-1:
Ground-launched cruise missile
Crisis significance:
Threat to forces attacking Cuba

Its place in the crisis

The Soviet deployment included tactical nuclear weapons as well as the strategic ballistic missiles. Luna rockets and FKR-1 cruise missiles served different military purposes, with the potential to attack invading forces and nearby military targets.

Their presence was not fully understood by American decision-makers during the confrontation. An invasion planned around conventional opposition could therefore have encountered a nuclear battlefield.

Possession of a nuclear weapon did not automatically mean that a local commander had unrestricted authority to use it. The surviving orders and later recollections require careful comparison. These weapons also complicate any claim that all nuclear danger ended on 28 October.

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Weapons for a battle on and around Cuba

The Soviet deployment included eighty nuclear warheads for FKR-1 cruise missiles and twelve for Luna rockets. These were separate from the strategic warheads intended for the R-12 and R-14. The FKR plan called for sixteen launchers, with a range of up to 180 kilometres; it was a weapon for the local theatre of operations.

Luna was a short-range battlefield rocket, whereas FKR-1 was a powered cruise missile. Both could make an American landing far more dangerous than a plan based only on conventional Cuban resistance suggested. The distinction between warhead inventory and launcher inventory is especially important here.

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Control and the longer withdrawal

The orders to General Issa Pliyev must be separated from later recollections about what commanders might have done under attack. The published documentary collection shows Moscow’s concern with retaining control over nuclear use; possession by a unit did not amount to a standing permission to fire.

The tactical warheads remained after the strategic-missile agreement. Mikoyan’s November discussions with the Cuban leadership preceded their final removal aboard the Arkhangelsk on 1 December. The familiar thirteen-day chronology therefore ends before the last Soviet nuclear warheads left Cuba.

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More views

An FKR-1 cruise missile displayed outdoors on its launch rail in Havana.
An FKR-1 cruise missile at the Havana weapons exhibition, 18 May 2009. The photograph shows a preserved display, not a deployed missile during the thirteen days.Martin Trolle Mikkelsen / FKR-1 Havana Weapons Exposition.jpg. Via Wikimedia Commons. Resized and converted to WebP; no further crop. This image remains CC BY-SA 2.0. Source record · CC BY-SA 2.0View full image ↗

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